theory of the firm – Escondido Framework

Applying the Escdondido Framework to Dark Ages Britain

I often wonder about the applicability of the Escondido Framework model of the firm to organisations in other cultures and at other times to the developed world in the 21^st century . One of the claims of the Escondido Framework is the degree to which it can be applied universally. Certainly, the model can be applied to public sector and third sector organisations, and can be applied wherever there is some sort of corporate collective structure that can be shown to create value that is greater than the sum of the efforts of the people who are working together within the structure if they were together in a set of discrete collaborations brought about by a set of separate agreements (whether explicit or implicit).

I have just completed reading Max Adams’ account of Britain in the 5^th to 7^th centuries, The First Kingdom[1]. This covers the period often known as the Dark Ages, following the departure of the Roman Empire and before settled control of England by Anglo-Saxon rulers in the Heptarchy. He pieces together the considerable research undertaken in recent years to describe a fragmentation of society, depopulation of most cities and towns and replacement by what may in many respects to a pre-Roman pattern of village economies and local tribal leadership, subject to incursions by Viking and north German raiding parties, but still with some loose links to continental Europe, with the Christianity that had arrived in the Roman period hanging on in places prior to reintroduction both from Ireland with Colme Cille (St Columba) and with St Augustine from Rome, and with continuing trade.

One of the key themes of the Escondido Framework is the identity of the corporation independent of stakeholders, the “societé anonyme” whose ultimate purpose is to survive, and which outlives its “controlling mind”. Adams marks the end of the period that he is describing by an important transition, from one in which the individual “kingdoms” were pretty fluid, some very small and sitting within and subject to other kingdoms (in a system described as Tribal Hidage), and most regimes pretty ephemeral.

“Victory on the battlefield and political success measured in tribute and booty secured the loyalty of secular élites for their king and his eligible successors; but for a life interest only. Defeat, if not fatal, weakened a king and exposed him to internal coup of external domination…..The luck of the tribe was invested so heavily in the person of its kings that when they died any imperium that they may have exercised over rival kings was void.

“As Bede so vividly described it, the pagan supernatural experience was in some sense like the passing of a sparrow into and out of a hall whose warmth and fellowship matched their brief period of Earth while all before and after was cold darkness unknown…..

“Pagan kingship was not stupidly irrational. Rulers were bound by conventions of honour, reciprocity and political pragmatism. They calculated odds as coolly – and with about as much reliance on superstition – as any politician or football coach whose tenure might be equally precarious.”[2]

But this changes with a new social contract, between church and king, that reflects the new world being constructed with the arrival of Christianity and the conversion of the rulers, whose souls continue after death. Adams cites a law of Wihtred, king of Kent 690 -725: “The Church shall enjoy immunity from taxation; and the king shall be prayed for” before noting:

“The rapid seventh-century establishment of monastic communities across the Insular kingdoms, supported by extensive, formerly royal estates and nurture by their relations with kings, parallels the history of secular territorial lordship founder on the right to exact and collect renders from lands and communities, but with a a critical difference. The unique brilliance of this new social contract was to convert landed assets otherwise held for a mere life interest – the so-called folcland held by the thegns and gesiths form the king, which returned to the royal portfolio on their death – into a freehold bocland of abbots and abbesses. Bocland or bookland – what we would call freehold – was fundamental to a relationship meant to last for eternity on Earth and in heaven. It allowed the church to invest in physical labour and material wealth in permanent settlements free from the obligation of military service and taxation; to capitalize agriculture an technology. It laid the foundations for a literate, institutional clerical caste and formation concepts of obligations owed by kings to their people.”

Permanence is the key word – even if in due course the success of the monastic corporations became the seed of their undoing at the Reformation. The monastery or convent was greater than the abbot or abbess. The kingdom also secured more permanence, even if an institutional fluidity remained until the major kingdoms of the Heptarchy progressively consolidate and became on under Athelstan in the 10^th century.

[1] Adams, Max (2021). The First Kingdom: Britain in the Age of Arthur. ISBN-13 : 978-1788543477

[2] Ibid. pp 398 -399.

HBR Case Study: Do Business and Politics Mix?

The case study feature in the November 2014 issue of Harvard Business Review is titled “Do Business and Politics Mix?” At the most basic level, this is a daft question. The fact that it has been worded like this illustrates some of the shortcomings in the way that business in general, and the nature of firm in particular, is discussed. It is not a matter of whether they mix, business operates within a political environment. Indeed , many businesses engage with least two “markets interfaces” that are essentially political in nature. The question should not be “do they mix”, but how does a firm position itself on each of the political market interfaces.

The case study describes a fictional US business called Natural Foods that has made donations to a “super PAC” (a peculiarly American artifice for getting round restrictions on the financing of candidates for political office) funding pro-business candidates, only to discover that one of the candidates backed by the super PAC takes an anti-gay stance. The characters in the case study debate whether or not they should be trying to engage with the political establishment, by funding candidates in order to secure influence with the legislative and executive branches of government, and how they should present themselves to their public and to their immediate stakeholders, who are socially liberal.

The value of this case study is not the specific conundrum faced by the management of the fictional business or the advice provided the pundits assembled by HBR to comment on it. Rather, it is elegant illustration of the significance of political aspects of market interfaces illustrated in the case: the interface with the branches of government as regulators and enablers, and the political dimensions of the market interfaces with employees and customers, for whom the political positions with which the company is identified are considerations in their dealings with the company.

“Shareholders do not own companies, nor do they own the assets of companies”

Six academics, from law schools and business schools in the US, UK, and continental Europe, have written a first class letter to the Financial Times today, printed under the headline “Acknowledge that companies remains separate legal entities”.

They take the Business Secretary to task for slipping into the trap of asserting, in the course of the controversy over bankers’ pay, that shareholders “own” banks.

Kent Greenfield and his colleagues write:

“….the notion that shareholders own companies is simply incorrect.

Shareholders do not own companies, nor do they own the assets of companies.

Shareholders own shares of stock – bundles of intangible rights, most particularly the rights to receive dividends and to vote on limited issues.

Unfortunately the erroneous notion….that shareholders own companies seems to have side tracked the discussion, and policy formation, around corporate governance leading to an inappropriate and ultimately counterproductive focus on shareholders.

…..companies are separate legal entities, without owners, and effective corporate governance involves the consideration of a variety of parties not, necessarily, shareholders.”

Signatories to the letter: Kent Greenfield (Boston College Law School); Andrew Johnston (University of Sheffield); Jean-Philippe Robé (Sciences Po Law School, Paris); Beate Sjåfjell (University of Oslo); Andre Spicer (Cass Business School); Hugh Willmott (Cardiff Business School)

1993 Tomorrow’s Company paper and latest paper for Cranfield Renewing Capitalism project

Two papers setting out some of the key ideas in the framework have been added to the site. A paper written for Tomorrow’s Company, when in its initial phase under the sponsorship of the Royal Society of Arts, can be found on the Origins page. A recent paper written for the Cranfield Institute’s Renewing Capitalism initiative can be found on the home page.